

MEMORANDUM FOR: APEX Steering Group Members

Per your request at the 21 February Steering Group meeting, attached are questions and answers on the 4-C Program, stemming from the DCI's testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.



Special Assistant to the DCI
for Compartmentation

Attachment

Date 21 February 1980

OS REGISTRY

FILE Security 18

20 February 1980

Also: Committees 16A
Also: Commo 9

Question #47

The initial funding for the new APEX Security Compartmentation Program of has been included in the FY 1981 budget. Would you briefly describe this new start?

Answer

The APEX Security Compartmentation Program item of in the FY 1981 budget will be used primarily to establish an on-line interactive inter-Agency register of compartmented access to provide a uniform and complete record of who has what access and who had them when, as well as what organization sponsored the access. The system will also, in time, keep track of compartmented facilities and will permit the data in the register to be assembled and manipulated for managerial tracking of changes in numbers of compartmented intelligence access approvals. The system will be known as the Community-Wide Computer-Assisted Compartmentation Control System (4-C).

CONFIDENTIAL

20 February 1980

Question #48

What are the specific line items or purposes for which the

AT will be spent?

Answer

Personnel

Hardware

Software

Communication and encryption equipment

Site preparation

Exact amounts are presently being calculated based on several alternatives in each category.

(For information of RMS only: The CIA 4-C team (primarily OS, ODP, and OC) has promised that desired \$'s will be to me by 26 February. Some are available now, e.g., Commo \$700,000.)

UNCLASSIFIED

20 February 1980

Question #49

What will be the operational impact of this more restrictive program?

Answer

- a. Far fewer people should have access to details of the operation of sensitive collection programs.
- b. That operational information needed by analysts, taskers and the like will be better defined and better controlled.
- c. Product of sensitive collection operation, especially overhead imagery and ELINT should be more easily available to its user. The decompartmentation decisions reached in the course of APEX deliberations should more than counter-balance APEX imposed procedures. These procedures are intended to establish more precisely "need to know" and information flows are to be restricted only when "need to know" does not exist.
- d. The change to a single Community-wide system for control of sensitive compartmented national foreign intelligence should provide better security across the board, if only because we will have a simpler and more uniform system that will be better understood.

25

20 February 1980

Question #50

Is this a Presidentially directed program?

Answer

Yes, on 10 January 1980.

CONFIDENTIAL